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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
KEITH HOLBROOK and GENEVE
K. HOLBROOK,
Plaintiffs-Respondents
vs.
ELWOOD S. CARTER and LINDA
N. CARTER,
Defendants,
J. HENRY EHLERS and NELLIE
J. EHLERS,
Defendants-Appellants.

Case No.

10777

RESPONDENTS BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Respondents seek to quiet title to certain real
property acquired by quit claim deeds and adverse
possession.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial court quieted title in favor of plaintiffs-respondents (Holbrooks) and dismissed the
counterclaim of defendants-appellants (Ehlers).
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts are not in dispute in this case ; however, the Appellants, in their attempt to summarize
them in their brief, have left out some very pertinent
ones. Therefore, the facts as stipulated to by the
parties and upon which the Lower Court based its
judgment are here set out in full: (R-21 through
R-23).

"l. That on July 1, 1949 at the so-called Salt
Lake County May Sale, Salt Lake County sold to
Rennold Pender, Margaret J. Eliason and defendant, J. Henry Ehlers, the property described in ·
the Complaint on file herein which is the subject matter of this litigation, and gave to said Rennold Pender, Margaret J. Eliason and J. Henry Ehlers its
so-called tax deed covering said property.
"At the time of the receipt of said deed, Pender
and J. Henry Ehlers orally agreed between themselves that Pender could use the land as to Ehler's
interest and for such use would pay taxes thereon
attributable to Ehlers; that plaintiffs had no knowledge of this oral agreement at any time pertinent
herein. (Emphasis Added)

"2. That on or about June 11, 1951, Rennold
Pender for a good and valuable consideration made
and executed his Quit Claim Deed to plaintiffs conveying his interest to them in the subject property,
and that on or about June 21, 1951, Margaret, J.
Eliason for a good and valuable consideration executed and delivered to plaintiffs her Quit Claim
Deed conveying her interest in said property.
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"3. That shortly after receipt of the Pender
and Eliason deeds as set forth above, planitiffs contacted defendant, J. H. Ehlers, through one W. Louis
Gardner to ascertain if Ehlers would sell his interest in the subject property to plaintiffs. Ehlers stated
to Gardner that he would not sell.
"4. Neither plaintiffs nor defendants, Ehlers,
have ever had personal contact or discussions with
each other concerning the property.
"5. That immediately following the receipt of
the two deeds' aforesaid by plaintiffs, plaintiffs took
physical possession of the property and enclosed the
same with a strong, stock-proof, wire and post fence,
which said fence has, since the date of erection on
or about the month of July, 1951, stood in good repair against all persons. That plaintiffs have during said 15 years and at various time affixed to the
wire enclosing said field, signs of various types,
particularly during hunting seasons, which said
signs have stated 'No Tresspassing,' 'No Hunting,'
'Private Property' and related wording. That for
said 15 years last past plaintiffs have had good and
sufficient gates at the entrance to said enclosure surrounding said real property.
"6. That defendant, J. Henry Ehlers, was personally aware that defendants had fenced the property as set forth in paragraph 5 next above and
personally went through the gates in said fence enclosing the property at one time or another subsequent to the fencing.
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"7. That for the first three or four agricultural
seasons following June, 1951, plaintiffs plowed the
property, sowed various grains therein and harvested the same. That for the last ten years, approximately, plaintiffs have plowed and seeded the land
to alfalfa and pasturage. That during said 15 years
last past plaintiffs have irrigated said land with
irrigation water, which water was their sole and
separate property.
"8. That at no time during said 15 years last
past has the public at large ever had any physical
ingress or egress of said property by reason of the
installation of the fences, gates and the constant
surveillance and supervision of the property by plaintiffs. That plaintiffs in connection with their farming and agricultural usages of other lands surrounding the subject premises have rented the use of the
subject premises for pasturage and so forth and have
held themselves out to the public at large as the owners thereof, and have duly collected any rents imposed
for pasturage thereon.
"9. That plaintiffs have paid all and singular,
the total property taxes assessed against said property since the year 1951 to date hereof, and the
defendants, nor any of them, have not paid any of
said taxes nor have offered to reimburse plaintiffs
for the payment of said taxes. Defendant, J. Henry
Ehlers, from time to time during said 15-year period
personally checked the Salt Lake County records and
determined that the taxes had been paid by plaintiffs.
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"10. That defendant, J. H. Ehlers, from some
time prior to July, 1949 and during the 15 years
subsequent thereto has been aware of acts necessary
to adverse fee title owners by one relying upon color
of title through a tax deed having made it a practice
to purchase the so-called tax deeds from Salt Lake
County and has been, at all times pertinent herein,
generally familiar with the laws of the State of Utah
governing the doctrine of adverse possession; that he
has perfected title in the time above set forth to certain tax deeds which he has purchased, by means of
purchase, adverse 'possession litigation and related
means.
"To the extent that the within and foregoing
Stipulation of Facts contradicts the factual statements set forth in the affidavits of plaintiffs and
defendants on file herein, this Stipulation of Facts
shall prevail over assertions of fact in said affidavits.
"WITNESS OUR HANDS this 14th day of
October, 1966.
"Isl Christian Ronnow
CHRISTIAN RONNOW
Attorney for Plaintiffs
57 4 East 2nd South
Salt Lake City, Utah
"Isl Milton V. Backman
MILTON V. BACKMAN
Attorney for Defendants,
Ehlers
1111 Deseret Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah"
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ARGUMENT
Point I
THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT QUIETING TITLE IN THE HOLBROOKS MUST BE
AFFIRMED BECAUSE THE HOLBROOKS ACQUIRED COLOR OF TITLE TO THE PROPERTY
BY QUIT CLAIM DEEDS AND SUBSEQUENTLY SATISFIED THE UTAH STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS FOR ADVERSE POSSESSION.

Color of Title:
The Holbrooks purchased the real property in
question from Rennold Pender and Margaret J. Eliason by quit claim deeds. Certified copies of the quit
claim deeds are included in the file of this matter,
and the Court is requested to take judicial notice of
each deed. This Court can and has taken judicial
notice of such documents which appear of public
record. State Board of Land Commissioners, et al.
v. Ririe, 56 U. 213, 190 P. 59, (1920); McGarry
v. Thompson, 114 U. 442, 201 P.2d 288 (1948).

Adverse Possession :
The Utah Legislature has set out provisions
whereby title to property can be acquired by adverse
possession. Section 78-12-8, U.C.A. 1953 provides in
part:
Whenever it appears that the occupant
... entered into possession of the property
under claim of title, exclusive of other right,
founding such claim upon a written instrument as being a conveyance of the property
in question . . . and that there has been a
continued occupation and possession of the
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property included in such instrument . . . or
of some part of the property under such claim
for seven years, the property so included is
deemed to have been [held] adversely . . .
Section 78-12-9, U.C.A., 1953 sets forth the requirements of obtaining title by adverse possession
as follows:
For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession by any person claiming a
title founded upon a written instrument or
a judgment or decree, land is deemed to have
been possessed and occupied in the following
cases:
( 1) Where it has been usually cultivated
or improved.
(2) Where it has been protected by a
substantial inclosure.
( 3) Where, although not inclosed, it has
been used for the supply of fuel, or of fencing
timber for the purpose of husbandry, or for
pasturage or for the ordinary use of the occupancy.
( 4) ...
The Holbrooks have been in possession for over
fifteen ( 15) years, twice the required period!
The Holbrooks have paid all of the taxes on the
property since 1951 !
Immediately after taking possession, the Holbrooks inclosed the real property with a "strong,
stock-proof, wire and fence post," which said fence
has since the date of its erection in July of 1951 stood
in good repair against all persons.
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The Holbrooks have attached to the fence signs
such as: "No Hunting," "No Trespassing," and
"Private Property."
Gates have been installed and maintained by the /
Holbrooks at the entrances to the real property for
over fifteen ( 15) years.
For the first three or four agricultural seasons
following June, 1951, the Holbrooks plowed the property. They planted various grains and harvested the
crops.
For the last approximate ten (10) years, the
Holbrooks have plowed and seeded the land to alfalfa
and pasturage.
During the fifteen ( 15) years, the Holbrooks
have irrigated the land with their own water.
The Holbrooks have prevented the public from
entering the property by reason of the fences, gates,
and personal supervision and surveilance.
The Holbrooks have rented part of the ground
out for pasturage.
The Holbrooks have held themselves out to the
public as the owners of the land.
1

Point II
THE HOLBROOKS ARE "STRANGERS" TO
EHLERS, NOT CO-TENANTS, AND THEREFORE, THE HOLBROOKS' ASSERTION OF
OPEN AND EXCLUSIVE OWNERSHIP IN SEVERALTY CONSTITUTES AN OUSTER AS TO
EHLERS, AND AFTER SEVEN YEARS TITLE

9

BY ADVERSE POSSESSION BECAME VESTED
IN THE HOLBROOKS.
Appellants brief would lead the Court to believe
that the Holbrooks and Ehlers are co-tenants and
that this matter falls within the body of law annotated in 85 A.L.R. 1535 entitled "Right of CoTenant
to Acquire and Assert Adverse Title or Interest As
Against Other CoTenant."
Do not be misled. The Holbrooks are properly
characterized as "strangers" to the Ehlers, not "cotenants." This matter is thoroughly treated in 32
A.L.R.2d 1214 under the heading, "Possession By
Stranger Claiming Under Conveyance By Cotenant
As Adverse To Other Cotenants. Therein the proper
rule is stated as follows:
§2. General Rule (Supplementing 27 A.L.R. 8)
The general rule stated in the original
annotation that, where one of several cotenants conveys the joint estate by an instrument
purporting to vest the fee to the entire property in a grantee who is not a cotenant, and
the latter enters, asserting open and exclusive
ownership thereof, in severalty, the cotenant
not participating in the conveyance is deemed
to be ousted, and, on the termination of the
statutory period, title by adverse possession
becomes vested in the grantee.
See also 3 Am. Jur. 2d Adverse Possession §182,
71A.L.R.444.
The fact that the conveyances were by Quit
Claim Deeds would not alter this situation. See 32
A.L.R.2d 1221, 3 Am. Jur. 2d Adverse Possession
§183 .

•
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In addition, the fact that the Respondents knew
and in 1951 tried, through a third party, to purchase
the Appellants' interest is not a circumstance that
would preclude the ripening of title by adverse possession. 32 A.L.R.2d 1224.
Ehlers, Pender and Eliason bought the property
at tax sale. They were co-tenants.
Pender and Eliason later conveyed by quit claim
deed to the Holbrooks. Ehlers and the Holbrooks were
thus "strangers", not co-tenants.
Pender and Eliason did not expressly convey
just "a one-third interest" or "his interest" or "her
interest." The language of the deed purports to convey the entire interest. The certified copies of the
deeds show the exact language.
In McCready v. Fredericksen, 41 U. 388, 126
P. 316 (1912) which the Appellants cite, there was
a conveyance by one of the co-tenants to Fredericksen, a third party. The Court by way of dicta said
that if the grantee of one of the co-tenants had been '
in possession under the co-tenant's deed, claiming
title to the whole of the property, for the time required by the Statute of Limitations, he would have
acquired title by adverse possession.
Point III
EVEN ON APPELLANTS ERRONEOUS
THEORY THAT HOLBROOK AND EHLERS
WERE CO-TENANTS, THE TRIAL COURT
SHOULD BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE THE ACTS

•
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OF HOLBROOK WERE SUFFICIENT TO ACQUIRE TITLE BY ADVERSE POSSESSION
EVEN AS TO A CO-TENANT.
Appellants cite the following as the law for one
co-tenant adversing another co-tenant:
... he [the co-tenant in possession] must
show that at the time in question he was personally, or by tenant or agent, in actual possession of the premises, or of the particular
and sufficiently defined part of the premises
to which he makes claim, that he intended an
actual adverse possession operative as of that
time, that he did in fact hold and claim the
premises adversely, and lastly, that his cotenant or co-tenants had knowledge or notice
of that fact ... (82 A.L.R. 2d 5 at pp. 23, 24)
It is agreed between the parties that the Re-

spondents held possession of the premises for approximately 15 years from June 1951 and continuously thereafter. Thus, the requirement of actual
possession is clearly satisfied. The second requirement that the Respondents intended actual adverse
possession is apparent from the agreed facts setting
out their exclusive, hostile possession. The only question that properly could be inquired into on this appeal under Appellant's theory is whether the Appellants had notice of the adverse possession.
The Lower Court found the facts were sufficient
to put the Appellants on notice that the Respondents
intended to and were holding the property adverse to
Appellants' interest. In this connection it should be
pointed out that unless the Lower Court's judgment
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is clearly against the weight of the evidence or unless the Court has misapplied the principles of law
or equity, the finding of the Lower Court should
not be disturbed. Heiselt vs. Heiselt, 10 U2d 126,
349 P.2d 175 ( 1960). See also Clotworthy vs. Clyde,
1 U.2d 251, 265 P.2d 420, So unless it is clear
from the agreed facts that the facts do not import
notice to the Appellants of the open, notorious and
exclusive possession of the Respondents, the Lower
Court's finding should be affirmed. Viewing all of
the facts together, there is clearly more than enough
weight to warrant the determination of the Lower
Court.
Although generally the possession of property
by one co-tenant is considered to be for the benefit
of the other co-tenant, this does not mean that a cotenant cannot hold adversely to another co-tenant.
This is true only because of the close relationship
between co-tenants. One co-tenant's occupancy is
considered for the benefit of other co-tenants only
until there are facts that show his occupancy is in
repudiation of the rights of other co-tenants.
McCready vs. Fredericksen, 41 Utah 388, 126
Pac. 316 (1912), which the Appellants cite, sets out
the rule in Utah for obtaining title by adverse possession from a co-tenant. Under that case there is no
requirement of actual ouster. The possession must
be of such an open and notorious nature so as to
clearly show the world that this possession is intended to exclude and does exclude the rights of cotenants. Nevertheless, under the McCready rule,

1
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notice of ouster need not be actual, but may be implied from conduct.
There is a rule widely accepted in other jurisdictions that notice of ouster may be implied from
the long uninterrupted possession of property by a
co-tenant. Dixon vs. Henderson, 267 S.W.2d 869;
Black vs. Beagle, 59 Wyo. 268, 139, P.2d 439 ( 1943),
82 A.L.R.2d 132. The Court in Sperry vs. Tolley,
114 Utah 312, 199 P.2d 542 favorably acknowledged
this rule. There, the Court said:
Some jurisdictions hold that a sole, uninterrupted possession together with the exclusive taking of profits by one tenant in
common, with the knowledge by the others,
continued for a long series of years, without
any possession or claim of right and without
any participation in the profits, or demand for
them, if unexplained by any evidence tending
to show a reason for such neglect to assert a
right is sufficient to infer an ouster and
adverse possession.
The Respondents have held the property for 15
years, more than double the duration of the Statute
of Limitations. During that entire period they have
collected the rents and profits, leased the property, put
up no trespassing signs, paid taxes, farmed the property, fenced it, irrigated it, and in every respect
maintained exclusive and adverse possession against
all the world including the Appellants. At no time
have Appellants asserted any interest or claim to
title. They have made no demand for sharing in the
profits and have had absolutely no contact with the
Respondents, nor have Appellants offered any ex-
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planation as to the reason for sleeping on their rights.
Consequently, the long, continued delay coupled with
the exclusive, hostile possession of the Respondents
is sufficient to infer an ouster and adverse possess10n.
The Appellants, in their brief, attempt, by referring to previous cases, to establish what acts are
required to impute notice of adverse possession to
a co-tenant. They claim that the facts now before the
Court are insufficient by asserting that such acts
were held insufficient in the McCready, Sperry and
Heiselt cases. This conclusion is improper and would
be unfair if followed since the facts in this case are
different. So that justice might prevail, each case
should be decided on its own merits taking all factors into consideration. What is not sufficient in one
case might be sufficient in another. In Linebarger
v. Late, 214 Ark. 278, 216 S.W.2d 56 ( 1948) the
Court recognized this. The Court said:
Notice of the hostility of the possession
resulting from acts or conduct of the possessor
may appear in so many ways that judges and
text writers have not undertaken an enumeration. What in one case would be sufficient
warning might not be enough in another. The
rewtionship of the parties, their reasonable
access to the property and opportunity of or
necessity for dealing with it, their right to
rely upon the ~onduct and assur~nc~s of t~e
one in possession, matters of kmsh1p, business transactions directly or incidentally
touching the primary subject matter, the fact
of silence when there was a duty to speak,
natural inferences arising from indifference

1
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- these and other means of conveying or
concealing intent may be important in a particular case but not controlling in another;
consequently, there can be no "open and shut
rule" by which the result can be ascertained.
(Emphasis added)
One of the reasons for the rule that the possession of one co-tenant is possession for the others is
because of their right to rely upon each other. Where
the relationship is interrupted by a conveyance to
a third party stranger, what right does the other
co-tenant have to assume that the grantee will continue to hold possession for him and account to him
for all income and rent. The logical inference is for
him to be apprised that the grantees' interest may
be adverse to him. He at least has some duty to speak
and where a co-tenant sleeps on his rights for as long
as the Appellants have done without any contact or
any claim or assertion of their rights or without even
any explanation for the reason of their long delay,
the clear implication is that they have notice of ouster. When the Appellants' knowledge and understanding of the law of adverse possession is considered and
when, in fact, it is considered that the Appellants
themselves have utilized the doctrine to obtain clear
title to property purchased under tax deeds, notice
of ouster seems conclusive. The least that could be
said is that any reasonably prudent person would
have been on notice. In Black vs. Beagle (see supra)
the Court said:
From such acts it is the duty of the other
co-tenants to be informed thereof and to draw
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such reasonable inferences therefrom as prudent persons possessed of and interested in
like information would naturally do, and such
co-tenants out of possession cannot prevent
the operation of the Statute of Limitations by
proving that they did not know of the facts
affecting their interest or knowing of them
did not draw correct conclusions therefrom
... We think that, under the circumstances,
he can hardly come into a court of equity with
any hope of success. (Emphasis added)
Furthermore, the language of the deed from
Pender and Eliason to the Holbrooks purporting to
convey the entire interest would put Appellants on
notice that the Holbrooks were holding adversely to
them.
ARGUMENT
Point IV
THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT BETWEEN
APPELLANTS AND RESPONDENTS REL~
TIVE TO PERMISSIVE POSSESSION OF THE
REAL PROPERTY AND NO KNOWLEDGE BY
HOLBROOK OF THE ALLEGED AGREEMENT
OF PERMISSIVE POSSESSION AS BETWEEN
PENDER AND APPELLANT; HENCE, THE ALLEGED AGREEMENT IS NO BAR TO ADVERSE
POSSESSION.
Appellants claim that an agreement of the Appellants to allow their co-tenant to possess the property precludes the assertion of title by adverse possession. There was no such agreement between the
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Appellants and the Respondents here. (See italicized
last sentence of FACT STIPULATION, Paragraph
No. 1.) This is definitely not a case of permissive
possession as the Appellants' brief argues. It was
stipulated that the alleged agreement was between
the Appellants and Mr. Pender, and that the Respondents "have never had knowledge of their agreement."
The very existence of the agreement puts some
burden on the Appellants to inquire of the Respondents as to their intent with respect to the property.
Since there is no basis either in law or in fact for
the Appellants to rely upon an agreement made with
one grantor of the Respondents, it would be unreasonable and unfair to bind the Respondents to it. It
cannot be assumed that by the purchase of one cotenant's interest in the property that the purchaser
steps in the shoes of that co-tenant with respect to
a verbal agreement made between the co-tenants
three years prior. Such an assumption would be unreasonable.
CONCLUSION
Since the Respondents were strangers to Appellants not co-tenants, the law clearly supports the
judgment quieting title. But, even assuming the relationship of co-tenancy, the Appellants were on notice
of their adverse possession establishing clear title in
Respondents. The Lower Court's judgment should be
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affirmed since the weight of evidence supports it
and there was no misapplication of any principal
of law.
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